This article examines the impetus for the establishment of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in an effort to better understand how perceived threats to U.S. national security have evolved since the Cold War. The commands were created because new threats to American national security were inadequately addressed by the preexisting military organization. The Persian Gulf and Africa were considered strategically unimportant, thus there was a willingness to tolerate the awkward manner in which each area was divided between existing commands. As new threats emerged, however, each region gained strategic importance and new commands were established. Without a solid understanding of this process, AFRICOM’s planners risk making policy mistakes similar to those made during the creation of CENTCOM. Based on this study, there are five major areas from which AFRICOM can build these lessons learned: establishing unified command and control, ensuring a coordinated planning process, securing support from its African allies, properly funding the command’s needs, and clearly defining AFRICOM’s mandate.