Paul Collier’s book is based on a glaring truth mixed with a bevy of insight and precisely focused recommendations — some original and some less so. The central argument of the book is contained in the title: The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Collier points out that economic growth and convergence, especially in Asia, has ended the radical dichotomy between rich and poor countries, between North and South. Instead, the world is divided into a billion people in developed countries, four billion people in developing countries, and a billion people in countries that are stagnant, in decline, or disintegrating. The people in the latter group, who live mostly but not exclusively in Africa, are the bottom billion.

Collier’s research yields many fascinating insights into the state of the bottom billion countries. Their poverty and hopelessness is not new, but unlike the rest of the developing world, they are stuck there. The most original finding is the “conflict trap”: countries that suffer coups and civil war are mostly doomed to repeat them. Civil wars end only through exhaustion (consider, perhaps, Southern Sudan) or more happily through outside intervention (for example, Sierra Leone, Liberia). Unlike Jeffrey Sachs, whose The End of Poverty claims that “we have the solutions,” Collier is hesitant regarding what policies offer the best response to the situation of the bottom billion. Aid, Collier finds, is only marginally effective in stimulating development, though it may be necessary to stave off crisis. There is no easy path to growth, especially for landlocked countries. Corruption is always a problem but does not always stop growth (think of Indonesia); however, it is precisely in the resource-rich countries that depend on governments to redistribute their resource wealth that corruption most hampers effective government.

Collier is a native of Yorkshire, England, who has worked at the World Bank and throughout Africa. He currently directs the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University. The research he has led there is controversial; political scientists and anthropologists feel his characterization of civil wars as “mostly a result of greed rather than grievance” is oversimplistic. Collier deserves credit for pushing the boundaries of economic research, but some of his calculations seem overambitious. For instance, he estimates the average cost of a failed state at something like U.S. $64 billion. This may be true, but it’s not very helpful to use the same figure for states as different as the Congo (population 45 million) and Guinea-Bissau (population 1.5 million); the cost per person or dollar of gross domestic product would be more interesting. In any case, the gravity of a civil conflict is about the number of dead or displaced people, not just the economic output foregone.

The book’s most glaring omission is a list or map of the bottom billion countries. Collier tells us there are 58 of them and calls them “Africa+”, but does not publish the list for fear of stigmatizing the countries and keeping them in their bottom position. This is sensible: African countries rarely benefit from being “named and shamed” by White Europeans. They might, however, benefit from being “named and shamed” by each other. In his enthusiasm for targeting aid to “good” governments and military interventions à la Sierra Leone, Collier does not consider how the West might support African solutions to African problems. If France is too embarrassed to intervene in civil wars directly, why can’t France fund and supply an African Rapid Reaction Force in Darfur? If good governance is so important, how can Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which have a long record of forcing governments and business to respond to civil society, strengthen Africa’s vibrant media and nascent democratic institutions? Collier laments the economic illiteracy of Christian Aid and the antiglobalization lobby, but their passion and fundraising prowess can be turned to getting African governments to serve their own people better. Economists may advise governments on policy, but campaigners create the environment that makes radical reform happen.

Overall, this is a powerful and thought-provoking book. Multilaterals and NGOs should heed the call to focus on the people in the bottom billion, because the rest of the world will achieve the United Nations Millennium Development Goals without them. Activists and policy makers in developing countries should demand assistance but know that they are ultimately responsible for their own development. Collier’s book has little advice for them, save to “become more ambitious.” Collier’s work demands a sequel from a bottom billion economist, subtitled: “Why the poorest countries are failing and what we are going to do about it.”